Battle of Mill Springs

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This was the first major Union victory in the war. Thomas unhinged the eastern anchor of the Confederate defensive cordon in the Western theater, and the whole house of cards began to collapse.

The battle of Mill Springs, KY should more properly be named after Logan's Crossroads, as Mill Springs is on the other side of the Cumberland river, 10 miles from the primary battle site. Today Logan's Crossroads is called Nancy and is located 8 miles west of Somerset at the intersection of highways 80 and 235.

It was the first major Union Victory of the Civil War and was part of the struggle for the control of Cumberland Gap on the far right of the Confederate western theater which stretched from eastern Kentucky to Columbus, Ky. on the Mississippi River. Cumberland Gap was the main pass in the Cumberland Mountains between East Tennessee (rich in salt and essential metals for weapons production) and Kentucky.

East Tennessee was also largely in favor of remaining in the Union, and Jefferson Davis was determined to prevent it from seceding from the Confederacy. A lot of Unionists in East Tennessee were hanged in order

The overall Confederate commander of this theater was Albert Sydney Johnston who initially had very few forces with which to defend this huge area. Kentucky had been swept out of its position of "armed neutrality" into contested occupation when Gen. Leonidas Polk, without orders, crossed from Tennessee into Kentucky to take Columbus on the Mississippi on 4 Sept. 1861. Happily seizing on this pretext, the Federals then occupied Paducah and Louisville. At first all was

mass confusion, bluster, and propaganda on both sides, but gradually the struggle for Kentucky and Tennessee crystallized around a few key people and armies. The outcome of this contest would determine the outcome of the Civil War.

At the end of Nov. 1861 the Confederate general Felix Zollicoffer, former journalist, editor, and Whig politician from Tennessee, took position near Mill Springs about 70 miles northwest of Cumberland Gap with the intention of protecting the northern approach to the gap.

Although without formal military training and in poor health,Zollicoffer had displayed initiative up to that point. On 21 Oct. 1861 his attack on troops under Shoepf and Gerrard at Camp Wildcat (on the Wilderness Road 25 miles to the east of Somerset in the rugged Rockcastle Hills) was repulsed, but he was active

in the repression of the Revolt of the Unionists in East Tennessee (8-18 November 1861) which broke out at the approach of Thomas who had been ordered to move to Knoxville. Then, on 12 Nov. 1861 Sherman recalled Thomas and the revolt collapsed. Three days later Sherman was replaced by Buell.

Sherman had suffered some sort of nervous breakdown under the pressure of his one month of departmental command, postulating that A.S. Johnston was about to move out from Bowling Green, KY with 45,000 troops and sweep him, Sherman, out of Louisville into the Ohio. Johnston, however, had only 15,000 troops in Bowling Green, far too few for any such offensive. This development allowed Zollicoffer to advance out of the mountains, but he gravely miscalculated when

he established himself opposite Mill Springs on the north bank of the Cumberland with his back to the river.

To give him due credit, Zollicoffer had a reason for his decision. He wanted to control both banks of the river. In a communication of 17 Nov. 1861 he wrote: "If I can clear the banks of the Cumberland of our enemies, supplies may this winter be furnished us by boats from Nashville."

However, he didn't have the forces necessary for such an undertaking. Worse still, the landing at Beech Grove was at the end of a spit of hilly land with steep shoulders falling down to the river on one side, and into White Oak Creek in a ravine on the other, thus turning that spit into a funnel or trap for troops retreating back to the landing. Unfortunately for his soldiers, Zollicoffer didn't read maps, or perhaps had no map to read. If he had, he wouldn't have put his encampment on the north side of the river, at least not at that spot. He left himself no margin for error whatsoever.

Thomas' headquarters the day before the battle was about a mile to the left of the red star. Thomas' main line was just south of Somerset Road (Hwy. 80), and his vedettes (pickets on horses) were posted two miles ahead at Timmy Branch Creek. The Mill Springs Road depicted on the military map above, the route of the Confederates' approach and

retreat, is today highway 235 and leads 10 miles south to the river. Nevertheless, winter rains had flooded Fishing Creek so that troop movements across it were hindered.

When George Crittenden (older brother of the Union general Thomas Crittenden, son of the unionist and former Kentucky senator J. J. Crittenden) arrived at Knoxville on 24 Nov. 1861 to take command of the district he ordered Zollicoffer to move to a safer position on the south bank. However, when he arrived at Mill Springs to take charge in person on 2 Jan. 1862, he discovered that Zollicoffer had not obeyed the order, and that Thomas was approaching. Crittenden rashly

decided to remain there and fight. Imperishable glory is seldom to be won quickly through prudence. The following dispatch, which Crittenden sent to A.S. Johnston the evening before the battle, demonstrates that he was aware that he was in big trouble, and also that he was grasping at straws:

"I am threatened by a superior force of the enemy in front, and finding it impossible to cross the river, I will have to make the fight on the ground I now occupy.

How was Johnston, 90 miles away in Bowling Green, to "make a diversion" on such short notice? Moreover, Crittenden had had time to save himself. Although he had at his disposal only a small steamboat and two flatboats to get his troops and equipment across the river again, Thomas was still pretty far away on 2 Jan.

After all, Zollicoffer had got them over to the north bank somehow. Apparently Crittenden wasn't much for mapreading either. The responsibility for the debacle does not lie with Zollicoffer alone.

Thomas had just been named division commander under Buell on 2 Dec. 1861. This division was the nucleus of the later to be famous 14th Corps. It in turn had evolved from the First Kentucky Brigade which he had created and nurtured while

at Camp Dick Robinson under the aegis of General Robert Anderson. Buell had ordered Thomas to drive Zollicoffer out of Kentucky, but bad weather and worse roads had slowed his approach. However, he could afford to be patient because he certainly had maps, could read them, and knew that Zollicoffer was as good as caught in a bottle. In addition, he probably had read Zollicoffer's perfervid Proclamation to the People of Kentucky and could count on him to ignore the age-old dictum that discretion is the better part of valor.

In his command Thomas also had a brigade under Hungarian born Gen. Albin Schoepf, but it was on the other side of Fishing Creek, running high because of the recent heavy rains. This slowed Thomas' concentration of forces, and only a couple of regiments from Schoepf got to him in time to participate in the battle. Crittenden decided to take the initiative before Thomas could complete his combination with Schoepf, and attacked Thomas' 4000 men with about an equal number of troops early in the morning on 19 Jan. 1862. The Confederates, having

marched all night in cold, driving rain, hoped to steal a march on Thomas, but in vain. Thomas had thrown out several lines of pickets, and it was impossible to surprise him (a nice touch which would have saved many Union lives at Shiloh). It also did not help that Crittenden's men were mostly equipped with primitive flintlock muskets whose ability to fire suffered greatly under those conditions. Just imagine spreading powder on a flash pan in the rain. It turned into a confused push and shove contest between scattered units.

Moreover, Thomas' trademark, the artillery, swept the field, and the Confederate artillery never even unlimbered. Early in the engagement Zollicoffer lost his bearings and approached the Union position thinking he was still within his lines. He spoke to Union officer, a Col. Fry, thinking he was a Confederate, and the Union officer replied, thinking Zollicoffer was a Federal. However, when one of Zollicoffer's aides recognized that the unit was hostile, he opened fire, and

Col. Fry returned fire, killing Zollicoffer. Some of Zollicoffer's units then began to retreat. Crittenden was able to restore order, but only temporarily.

While green Minnesota troops kept Crittenden engaged in the center, Thomas' experienced Ohio unit (Germans from Cincinatti who had fought in West Virginia) carried out a counter-attack against and around Crittenden's left and crushed it. This in turn broke the entire Confederate line which fell back in disorder to the Cumberland. Thomas' troops pursued vigorously for 10 miles, but were held up by fortifications at the landing. All that night Crittenden's men crossed

over to the south bank on the steamboat, leaving their heavy equipment and wounded behind. Most of Confederate troops then simply went home, and Crittenden's little army dissolved.

Thomas reported 246 casualties (39 killed, 207 wounded). This amounted to 6%, typical for battles in which Thomas commanded.. Crittenden made no report of his losses, but they are estimated at 533, including 150 killed and 353 wounded. After the battle, amid rumors that he had been drunk during the battle, which may or may not have been true, or only partially true, Crittenden was removed from command, and he served in no further sifgnificant military capacity during the war. An aside: Getting drunk was a method adopted by many commanders on both sides to enable them to face battle. They had to lead from the front, a hard job.

After the battle, Thomas again proposed that he be allowed to move on Knoxville through the Cumberland Gap, but Buell had his eye on Nashville, perhaps correctly so in view of the condition of the mountain roads at that time of the year. A month later on 24 Feb. 1862, Buell occupied Nashville. It hadn't been fortified, there was no opposition, and it remained under Union control for the

remainder of the war. It was the first Confederate state capitol and major industrial center to fall, and the significance of this was not just symbolic.

With the disintegration of Crittenden's army, A.S. Johnston's entire tenuous defensive line in Kentucky began to unravel. Bowling Green was uncovered and therefore abandoned to Buell without a fight on 14 Feb. 1862, and Fort Donelson, the next key position to the west, became untenable. Buell was also approaching, and these circumstances certainly influenced the indecisive behavior of generals

Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner in the face of Grant's improvised siege which lasted from 13 to 16 Feb. 1862. I say improvised because, in his haste to beat Buell to Ft. Donelson, Grant left his troops' tents, rations and winter clothing behind, and drove his men through freezing rain while measles and smallpox swept their ranks.

A comparison of Grant's and Thomas' conduct of their two first battles reveals the essential features of their respective command styles - Thomas was present, sober, prepared, shared the danger with his men, his men were healthy and inoculated, his command was harmonious, and his men were under control after the battle; Grant was absent, not so sober, surprised, protected from enemy fire, his men were diseased, he had dissention within his command, and his troops pillaged the countryside after the battle. These features would repeat themselves in battle after battle. Grant's style won headlines, Thomas' style won the war and laid the basis for our modern army.

Another distinguishing feature of Thomas' leadership lay in the fact that, at this battle and during the entire war, he issued no demands for surrender, nor pompous proclamations to the troops or the people. Thomas was all business. The comparison between Crittenden's conduct of the battle and that of Thomas is also revealing. An army of the past preemptively attacked the army of the future, and lost. The battle of Mill Springs was, in many respects, a microcosm of the entire Civil War.