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BATTLE
OF LOGAN’S CROSSING
(Mill Springs) 19 Jan. 62
This
was the first major Union victory in the war. Thomas unhinged the eastern anchor
of the Confederate defensive cordon in the Western theater, and the whole house
of cards began to collapse.
The
battle of Mill Springs, KY should more properly be named after Logan's
Crossroads, as Mill Springs is on the other side of the Cumberland river, 10
miles from the primary battle site. Today Logan's Crossroads is called Nancy and
is located 8 miles west of Somerset at the intersection of highways 80 and 235.
It
was the first major Union Victory of the Civil War and was part of the struggle
for the control of Cumberland Gap on the far right of the Confederate western
theater which stretched from eastern Kentucky to Columbus, Ky. on the
Mississippi River. Cumberland Gap was the main pass in the Cumberland Mountains
between East Tennessee (rich in salt and essential metals for weapons
production) and Kentucky.
East
Tennessee was also largely in favor of remaining in the Union, and Jefferson
Davis
was determined to prevent it from seceding from the Confederacy. A lot of
Unionists in East Tennessee were hanged in order
to
prevent the establishment of such a dangerous precedent.
Among
the Union forces were the 4th and 12th Kentucky and the 2nd
Tennessee
brigades. They were all volunteers.
The
overall Confederate commander of this theater was Albert Sydney Johnston who
initially had very few forces with which to defend this huge area. Kentucky had
been swept out of its position of "armed neutrality" into contested
occupation when Gen. Leonidas Polk, without orders, crossed from Tennessee into
Kentucky to take Columbus on the Mississippi on 4 Sept. 1861. Happily seizing on
this pretext, the Federals then occupied Paducah and Louisville. At first all
was
mass
confusion, bluster, and propaganda on both sides, but gradually the struggle for
Kentucky and Tennessee crystallized around a few key people and armies. The
outcome of this contest would determine the outcome of the Civil War.
At
the end of Nov. 1861 the Confederate general Felix Zollicoffer, former
journalist, editor, and Whig politician from Tennessee, took position near Mill
Springs about 70 miles northwest of Cumberland Gap with the intention of
protecting the northern approach to the gap.
Although
without formal military training and in poor health,Zollicoffer had displayed
initiative up to that point. On 21 Oct. 1861 his attack on troops under Shoepf
and Gerrard at Camp Wildcat (on the Wilderness Road 25 miles to the east of
Somerset in the rugged Rockcastle Hills) was repulsed, but he was active
in
the repression of the Revolt of the Unionists in East Tennessee (8-18 November
1861) which broke out at the approach of Thomas who had been ordered to move to
Knoxville. Then, on 12 Nov. 1861 Sherman recalled Thomas and the revolt
collapsed. Three days later Sherman was replaced by Buell.
Sherman
had suffered some sort of nervous breakdown under the pressure of his one month
of departmental command, postulating that A.S. Johnston was about to move out
from Bowling Green, KY with 45,000 troops and sweep him, Sherman, out of
Louisville into the Ohio. Johnston, however, had only 15,000 troops in Bowling
Green, far too few for any such offensive. This development allowed Zollicoffer
to advance out of the mountains, but he gravely miscalculated when
he
established himself opposite Mill Springs on the north bank of the Cumberland
with his back to the river.
To
give him due credit, Zollicoffer had a reason for his decision. He wanted to
control both banks of the river. In a communication of
17 Nov. 1861
he wrote: "If I can clear the banks of the Cumberland of our
enemies, supplies may this winter be furnished us by boats from Nashville."
However,
he didn't have the forces necessary for such an undertaking. Worse still, the
landing at Beech Grove was at the end of a spit of hilly land with steep
shoulders falling down to the river on one side, and into White Oak Creek in a
ravine on the other, thus turning that spit into a funnel or trap for troops
retreating back to the landing. Unfortunately for his soldiers, Zollicoffer
didn't read maps, or perhaps had no map to read. If he had, he wouldn't have put
his encampment on the north side of the river, at least not at that spot. He
left himself no margin for error whatsoever.
Thomas'
headquarters the day before the battle was about a mile to the left of the red
star. Thomas' main line was just south of Somerset Road (Hwy. 80), and his
vedettes (pickets on horses) were posted two miles ahead at Timmy Branch Creek.
The Mill Springs Road depicted on the military map above, the route of the
Confederates' approach and
retreat,
is today highway 235 and leads 10 miles south to the river.
Nevertheless, winter rains had flooded Fishing Creek so that troop
movements across it were hindered.
When
George Crittenden (older brother of the Union general Thomas Crittenden, son of
the unionist and former Kentucky senator J. J. Crittenden) arrived at Knoxville
on 24 Nov. 1861 to take command of the district he ordered Zollicoffer to move
to a safer position on the south bank. However, when he arrived at Mill Springs
to take charge in person on 2 Jan. 1862, he discovered that Zollicoffer had not
obeyed the order, and that Thomas was approaching. Crittenden rashly
decided
to remain there and fight.
Imperishable glory is seldom to be won quickly through prudence. The
following dispatch, which Crittenden sent to A.S. Johnston the evening before
the battle, demonstrates that he was aware that he was in big trouble, and also
that he was grasping at straws:
"I
am threatened by a superior force of the enemy in front, and finding it
impossible to cross the river, I will have to make the fight on the ground I now
occupy.
If
you can do so, I would ask that a diversion be made in my favor."
How
was Johnston, 90 miles away in Bowling Green, to "make a diversion" on
such short notice? Moreover, Crittenden had had time to save himself. Although
he had at his disposal only a small steamboat and two flatboats to get his
troops and equipment across the river again, Thomas was still pretty far away on
2 Jan.
After
all, Zollicoffer had got them over to the north bank somehow. Apparently
Crittenden wasn't much for mapreading either. The responsibility for the debacle
does not lie with Zollicoffer alone.
Thomas
had just been named division commander under Buell on 2 Dec. 1861. This division
was the nucleus of the later to be famous 14th Corps. It in turn had evolved
from the First Kentucky Brigade which he had created and nurtured while
at
Camp Dick Robinson under the aegis of General Robert Anderson. Buell had ordered
Thomas to drive Zollicoffer out of Kentucky, but bad weather and worse roads had
slowed his approach. However, he could afford to be patient because he certainly
had maps, could read them, and knew that Zollicoffer was as good as caught in a
bottle. In addition, he probably had read Zollicoffer's perfervid Proclamation
to the People of Kentucky and could count on him to ignore the age-old dictum
that discretion is the better part of valor.
In
his command Thomas also had a brigade under Hungarian born Gen. Albin Schoepf,
but it was on the other side of Fishing Creek, running high because of the
recent heavy rains. This slowed Thomas' concentration of forces, and only a
couple of regiments from Schoepf got to him in time to participate in the
battle. Crittenden decided to take the initiative before Thomas could complete
his combination with Schoepf, and attacked Thomas' 4000 men with about an equal
number of troops early in the morning on 19 Jan. 1862. The Confederates, having
marched
all night in cold, driving rain, hoped to steal a march on Thomas, but in vain.
Thomas had thrown out several lines of pickets, and it was impossible to
surprise him (a nice touch which would have saved many Union lives at Shiloh).
It also did not help that Crittenden's men were mostly equipped with primitive
flintlock muskets whose ability to fire suffered greatly under those conditions.
Just imagine spreading powder on a flash pan in the rain. It turned into a
confused push and shove contest between scattered units.
Moreover,
Thomas' trademark, the artillery, swept the field, and the Confederate artillery
never even unlimbered. Early in the engagement Zollicoffer lost his bearings and
approached the Union position thinking he was still within his lines. He spoke
to Union officer, a Col. Fry, thinking he was a Confederate, and the Union
officer replied, thinking Zollicoffer was a Federal. However, when one of
Zollicoffer's aides recognized that the unit was hostile, he opened fire, and
Col.
Fry returned fire, killing Zollicoffer. Some of Zollicoffer's units then began
to retreat. Crittenden was able to restore order, but only temporarily.
While
green Minnesota troops kept Crittenden engaged in the center, Thomas'
experienced Ohio unit (Germans from Cincinatti who had fought in West Virginia)
carried out a counter-attack against and around Crittenden's left and crushed
it. This in turn broke the entire Confederate line which fell back in disorder
to the Cumberland. Thomas' troops pursued vigorously for 10 miles, but were held
up by fortifications at the landing. All that night Crittenden's men crossed
over
to the south bank on the steamboat, leaving their heavy equipment and wounded
behind. Most of Confederate troops then simply went home, and Crittenden's
little army dissolved.
Thomas
reported 246 casualties (39 killed, 207 wounded). This amounted to 6%, typical
for battles in which Thomas commanded.. Crittenden made no report of his losses,
but they are estimated at 533, including 150 killed and 353 wounded. After the
battle, amid rumors that he had been drunk during the battle, which may or may
not have been true, or only partially true, Crittenden was removed from command,
and he served in no further sifgnificant military capacity during the war. An
aside: Getting drunk was a method adopted by many commanders on both sides to
enable them to face battle. They had to lead from the front, a hard job.
After
the battle, Thomas again proposed that he be allowed to move on Knoxville
through the Cumberland Gap, but Buell had his eye on Nashville, perhaps
correctly so in view of the condition of the mountain roads at that time of the
year. A month later on 24 Feb. 1862, Buell occupied Nashville. It hadn't been
fortified, there was no opposition, and it remained under Union control for the
remainder
of the war. It was the first Confederate state capitol and major industrial
center to fall, and the significance of this was not just symbolic.
With
the disintegration of Crittenden's army, A.S. Johnston's entire tenuous
defensive line in Kentucky began to unravel. Bowling Green was uncovered and
therefore abandoned to Buell without a fight on 14 Feb. 1862, and Fort Donelson,
the next key position to the west, became untenable. Buell was also approaching,
and these circumstances certainly influenced the indecisive behavior of generals
Pillow,
Floyd, and Buckner in the face of Grant's improvised siege which lasted from 13
to 16 Feb. 1862. I say improvised because, in his haste to beat Buell to Ft.
Donelson, Grant left his troops' tents, rations and winter clothing behind, and
drove his men through freezing rain while measles and smallpox swept their
ranks.
A
comparison of Grant's and Thomas' conduct of their two first battles reveals the
essential features of their respective command styles
- Thomas was present, sober, prepared, shared the danger with his men,
his men were healthy and inoculated, his command was harmonious, and his men
were under control after the battle; Grant was absent, not so sober, surprised,
protected from enemy fire, his men were diseased, he had dissention within his
command, and his troops pillaged the countryside after the battle. These
features would repeat themselves in battle after battle. Grant's style won
headlines, Thomas' style won the war and laid the basis for our modern army.
Another
distinguishing feature of Thomas' leadership lay in the fact that, at this
battle and during the entire war, he issued no demands for surrender, nor
pompous proclamations to the troops or the people. Thomas was all business. The
comparison between Crittenden's conduct of the battle and that of
Thomas is also revealing. An army of the past preemptively attacked the
army of the future, and lost. The battle of Mill Springs was, in many respects,
a microcosm of the entire Civil War.
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